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ABSTRACT
An experimental analysis of two alternative theoretical posi­
tions concerning the role of awareness and the role of reinforcement 
in verbal conditioning was conducted. Reinforcement interpretations 
of verbal conditioning contend that performance gains initially result 
from the direct and ’’automatic" effects of reinforcement, and that 
gains occur prior to the time that the j> becomes aware of the response- 
reinforcement contingency. Cognitive explanations maintain that aware­
ness precedes, and is a necessary condition for, improvement in 
performance.
These alternative positions were tested by investigating the 
temporal relationship between the learning of awareness and the incep­
tion of performance gains as a function of reinforced practice. The 
premise underlying the study was that Ss respond differentially to 
social reinforcement and that it is the Si's reinforcement history on 
the verbal conditioning task that is crucial for performance gains and 
the learning of awareness. To test this assumption an experimental 
design in which reinforcement histories could be equated was employed.
Seventy-two undergraduate college students served as Ss. A 
modified Taffel procedure was used as the conditioning vehicle. Dur­
ing acquisition £>s received Training trials which permitted E to 
control the frequency of experience with the response class designated 
as "correct,” In this way the jSs1 reinforcement histories were equated 
by "forced" reinforcement "programmed" according to predetermined rates.
Frequency of selection of the "correct" response class on non-reinforced 
Test trials was the performance measure. Awareness was assessed by 
notes written by Ss after each Test trial and by a detailed postcondi­
tioning awareness interview.
Results supported the over-all prediction that significant per­
formance gains can occur prior to or in the absence of the learning of 
awareness as a function of reinforced practice. The following conclu­
sions appeared justified by the results:
1. Reinforcement exerts a differential effect upon performance 
and awareness.
2. Social reinforcers do not have the same strengthening 
effect upon all _Ss.
3. The temporal relationship between performance and aware­
ness posited by Spielberger and DeNike (1966) is an artifact of an 
insensitive methodology for obtaining reports of awareness during the 
conditioning task.
4. Notes written by j3s during the conditioning task can be 
reliably used for assigning ratings of awareness and unawareness.
5. Correlated hypotheses appear to be particularly suscep­
tible to erroneous ratings of awareness.
Implications of the present findings and suggestions for 
further research were discussed.
viii
INTRODUCTION
The results of the early investigations of verbal operant- 
conditioning were interpreted as demonstrating that verbal behavior, 
already available to the j3, may be modified by social reinforcement 
without the being aware of the principle (contingency) by which rein­
forcement was administered. Reinforcement theorists (Krasner, 1962; 
Postman and Sassenrath, 1961; Verplanck, 1962) contend that the effect 
of the reinforcer is direct, and not necessarily mediated by cognitive 
processes (i.e., awareness, operationally defined as the ability to 
verbalize the correct response-reinforcement contingency). According 
to the reinforcement position, awareness, if and when it occurs, is a 
consequence of improvement (performance gains) rather than its cause.
Recently, however, this interpretation has been questioned by 
investigators favoring a cognitive explanation (Dulany, 1962; Splel- 
berger, 1962). They have suggested, instead, that increases in the 
rate of emission of the reinforced response class (performance gains) 
in verbal conditioning experiments are mediated by conscious cognitive 
processes. That is, awareness precedes, and is a necessary condition 
for, performance gains.
Dulany (1962) and Spielberger (1962) have contended that the 
early reported findings of conditioning without awareness were an 
artifact of the method for assessing awareness. In particular, the 
early interviews or questionnaires were considered to be too brief 
and general, so that when an E obtained what seemed to be conditioning
2without the being able to verbalize the response-reinforcement (r-r) 
contingency, it was due, according to Dulany and Spielberger, to the 
insensitive questionnaires utilized in the postexperimental interviews. 
Levin (1961), using a detailed questionnaire containing 16 questions, 
tested this assumption. The first four questions were similar to those 
used to assess awareness in the early studies. Evidence for condi­
tioning without awareness was found when S's responses to the first 
four questions were used as the basis for inferring awareness. When 
the full interview was used " . . .  the evidence for conditioning with­
out awareness was found to have been largely accounted for by Ss who 
had been aware but whose awareness was not revealed by the brief inter­
view" (Levin, 1961, p. 74).
The Dulany-Spielberger explanation that performance gains in 
verbal conditioning are cognitively mediated is based, in part, upon 
repeated findings of a positive relationship between degree of aware­
ness and amount of verbal conditioning when more sensitive and detailed 
interviewing procedures are employed in assessing awareness. Other 
evidence cited in support of the cognitive position comes from studies 
which have investigated the temporal relationship between awareness 
and the inception of performance gains (DeNike, 1964; Spielberger, 
Bernstein, and Ratliff, 1966), To investigate this relationship 
DeNike had Ss write down their "thoughts about the experiment" (notes) 
after each block of conditioning trials. Upon completion of the con­
ditioning task (emission of human nouns) Sis were interviewed according 
to a detailed schedule of questions similar to Spielberger (1962). It
3was found that for 58 of the 61 j>s in the experimental group awareness 
ratings made on the basis of the notes agreed with those independently 
made on the basis of the interview. Further, DeNike found that only 
aware £3s showed performance gains and that increments in performance 
first occurred on the trial block on which aware jis first recorded 
that they had become aware of the r-r contingency. Statistical analy­
sis indicated that there was no tendency for performance to increase 
during the preawareness trial blocks. It was concluded that ". . . 
the results support the hypothesis that a cognitive learning process 
mediates performance gains in verbal conditioning" (DeNike, 1964, p. 
527).
Although the evidence presented by the cognitive researchers 
in support of their theory appears compelling, their two main ap­
proaches to investigating the events occurring in verbal condition­
ing (i.e., interview procedures and temporal relationships) are not 
without methodological shortcomings. With respect to interview pro­
cedures, Farber (1963) recognized the possibility that the correct 
r-r contingency may be suggested during the awareness interview by 
detailed questions of increasing specificity and, according to 
Greenspoon (1963), each successive question may provide j3 with some 
information about the contingency. Krasner and Ullmann (1963) main­
tained that the content of the interview itself may influence to 
view the conditioning task in retrospect and then formulate the con­
tingency, thus verbalizing an awareness that did not previously exist.
The investigation of the temporal relationship between
4awareness and the inception of performance gains has been highly in­
formative in that the problem has been narrowed down to a single trial 
block. Nonetheless, the findings of DeNike (1964) and Spielberger et 
al. (1966) are far from being unquestionable demonstrations of the 
priority of a learned response (awareness) which then cognitively 
mediates an increased output of the reinforced response. The £>'s 
"thoughts about the experiment" were written down only at the end of 
each block of 25 trials. Assuming that the £!s were appropriately moti­
vated to receive reinforcement, an unequivocal demonstration that the 
performance gains first noted on the "aware" trial block were mediated 
by cognitive processes would have required the report of a confirmed 
hypothesis (Spielberger and DeNike, 1966, p. 320) at the end of the 
preceding trial block or early in the "aware" trial block. Since the 
"aware" trial block data do not permit this type of determination, the 
argument that awareness of the contingency was a consequence of the 
performance gains is equally plausible.
It was with these two cognitive approaches to the experimental 
analysis of awareness in verbal conditioning that the present paper was 
concerned. The primary purpose was to investigate the temporal rela­
tionship between the learning of awareness and performance gains on a 
verbal conditioning task as a function of reinforcement. A major 
premise of the cognitive theory of verbal conditioning posited by 
Spielberger and DeNike (1966, pp. 314 and 320) is that performance 
gains (increases in the reinforced response) do not occur prior to 
verbalization of a correct or correlated r-r contingency (confirmed
5hypothesis). A necessary prediction from this cognitive theory is that 
Ss who are motivated to receive reinforcement can learn the r-r contin­
gency when reinforced at a level consistent with their rate of emission 
during the operant period. That is, some Ss are apparently able to 
make use of the information provided by reinforcement at this level in 
forming correct or correlated hypotheses which, in turn, mediate an 
increased output in the reinforced response. Others are not.
Within the framework of reinforcement theory it has been postu­
lated that social reinforcers do not have the same strengthening effect 
on all Ss (Baron, 1966; Kanfer and McBrearty, 1961). According to 
Philbrick and Postman (1955) the systematic application of social rein­
forcement in a verbal conditioning situation should lead to differen­
tial rates of emission of the reinforced response so that some Ss do not 
show an increase of the rate of emission above their operant level, 
whereas others do so at varying rates. An alternative explanation in 
reinforcement terms for the learning of awareness is that it is a func­
tion of the differential effects of social reinforcement upon the rates 
of emission of the designated response class. That is, it is the S's 
learning history (i.e., frequency of experience with the reinforcing 
stimulus) on the verbal conditioning task itself that is crucial for 
the subsequent development of awareness. A possible explanation, in 
these terms, for the typical finding that some Ss learn awareness and 
others do not is that the two groups have had unequal histories of 
reinforced practice on the conditioning trials. Those £s whose rate 
of emission increases in response to social reinforcement will, in
6turn, experience reinforcement more frequently and will be more likely 
to learn the relationship between their response and the reinforcement 
given by E.
The temporal relationship between awareness and performance 
gains was investigated in the present study under conditions of "pro­
grammed" reinforcement, and in the absence of the usual reciprocal 
interaction between Si's response on performance trials and reinforce­
ment given by E. This was accomplished by employing a modified Taffel 
(1955) procedure. The reciprocal interaction between S and E on per­
formance trials was eliminated by divorcing the conditioning (Training) 
trials from the performance (Test) trials and by reinforcing only on 
the Training trials. "Programmed" reinforcement was effected during 
Training by using "forced" trials. The stimulus materials (3x5-inch 
cards) used contained five personal pronouns; on each Training trial 
one of the pronouns was underlined. The J3 was instructed to select 
the underlined pronoun in constructing his sentence. In this manner, 
frequency of experience with the reinforced response class (and hence 
reinforcement) could be programmed according to predetermined rates. 
Each time the £3 was "forced" to use one of the pronouns designated as 
"correct," reinforcement was given. This design, then, treated both 
the learning of awareness and the inception of performance gains as 
dependent variables subject to the same Training conditions.
The second purpose of the present study was to evaluate the 
extent which awareness of the r-r contingency may be suggested or in­
fluenced by a detailed post-conditioning interview. The development
7or onset of awareness was assessed by having j5s write down during the 
Test trials their ideas concerning the rule or principle for construct­
ing sentences in the experiment. A postconditioning awareness inter­
view adapted from Dulany (1962) and Spielberger (1962) was also 
employed. Ratings of awareness from these two sources were compared 
and judgments as to whether awareness was learned during the trials or 
suggested by the interview were made.
The questions investigated and the methods of inquriy were as
follows:
1. Does reinforcement have a direct and "automatic" strength­
ening effect upon performance? That is, can there be a significant 
increase in response selection on the Test trials as a function of re­
inforced practice prior to or in the absence of the learning of aware­
ness? For £5s reporting awareness of a correct or correlated hypothesis 
in their notes during acquisition, this was determined by comparing 
their performance on the Test trials up to the point of the report.
2. Can the learning of awareness (as assessed by jj's notes) 
occur in the absence of an increase in reinforced practice on the 
Training trials as Spielberger and DeNike (1966) have contended?
This was tested by "programming" one Experimental group to receive 
reinforcement on each acquisition trial block at operant (chance) 
level.
3. Or, on the other hand, is an increment in reinforced prac­
tice necessary for the learning of awareness to occur? This was 
tested in two ways during acquisition:
8a. One Experimental group received "programmed" rein­
forcement initially at the operant level, which then 
gradually increased beginning with trial block two.
b. Another Experimental group received "programmed" 
reinforcement at the operant level on each of the 
first two trial blocks with an abrupt increase in 
"programmed" reinforcement on trial block three.
4. Gan the notes written by _Ss during acquisition be reliably 
used for rating awareness and for determining whether or not extended 
and detailed interviews suggest awareness. This determination was 
made by initially asking each _S during the postconditioning awareness 
interview to state his idea of the correct principle for constructing 
sentences in the experiment. It was expected that this statement 
would show close correspondence to the principle or principles 
written during acquisition. One of the last questions asked the j3 on 
the awareness interview was to again state his idea of the correct 
principle. If the £5 changed his opinion from his initial interview 
statement, further questioning attempted to determine whether the 
changed opinion was a function of interview suggestion or whether the 
j> simply had difficulty in conceptualizing his ideas.
The over-all prediction tested was that significant perfor­
mance gains (increases in the "correct" response class) can occur 
prior to or in the absence of the learning of awareness as a function 
of reinforced practice. The following five hypotheses were formulated 
to test this prediction.
91. When the verbal responses of Ss on the Training trials are 
followed by "programmed" reinforcement which does not increase above 
operant (chance) level, the frequency of "correct" pronoun responses 
of unaware _Ss will not be significantly altered on the Test trials.
2. When the verbal responses of j3s on the Training trials are 
followed by "programmed" reinforcement which increases above operant 
(chance) level, the frequency of "correct" pronoun responses of un­
aware Ss will be significantly raised on the Test trials.
3. The learning of awareness, if it occurs at all, will occur 
subsequent to performance gains on the Test trials and as a conse­
quence of the increase in "programmed" reinforcement on the Training 
trials.
4. The learning of awareness, if it occurs at all, will occur 
more often among £s receiving an increase in "programmed" reinforce­
ment during Training than among £>s receiving no increase in "pro­
grammed" reinforcement during Training.
5. Notes written by j3s during acquisition concerning the 
principle or rule for constructing sentences in the experiment can be 
reliably used for rating awareness of a correct or correlated r-r 
contingency.
METHOD
Subjects
The Ss were 72 volunteers from lower division undergraduate 
Psychology courses. Each j> received four experimental points or 
credits toward his course grade based upon time actually spent in 
the experiment. To induce motivation, however, the students were told, 
when contacted regarding participation, that they could earn from one 
to four points depending upon how actively they participated in the 
experiment. They.were asked not to volunteer if they were not will­
ing to come under these conditions.
The Ss were randomly assigned to one of four groups. The 
three Experimental groups and the Control group each contained 18 £>s. 
Males and females were equally represented in all groups. None of the 
Ss professed any prior knowledge of the experiment, nor had any pre­
viously participated in a verbal-conditioning study.
Materials and Experimental Design
A sentence construction task described by Taffel (1955) was 
employed as the operant-conditioning vehicle. Each sentence was 
designated as a trial; there were a total of 140 trials. The first 
20 trials constituted the operant (non-reinforced) period. This was 
followed by 120 acquisition trials consisting of four blocks of 30 
trials each. There were 20 Training trials and 10 Test trials within 
each block of acquisition trials. The trials within each acquisition 
block were presented in an alternating sequence of two Training
11
trials and one Test trial (i.e., 2 Training, 1 Test— 2 Training, 1 
Test--etc.).
All four groups received the same instructions, and all groups 
were treated alike (i.e., no reinforcement) during the operant and 
Test trials. The groups differed only during the Training trials with 
respect to frequency of experience with the pronouns and, hence, rein­
forcement .
The stimulus materials consisted of 140 3x5-inch plain white 
cards.^ Typed on each card were two different neutral past tense verbs 
taken from the list used by Binder and Salop (1961), plus the five 
pronouns (I, WE, YOU, HE, THEY). The order of appearance of the pro­
nouns was randomized over all cards within the operant period and over 
all cards within the acquisition period.
During the operant period j3's task was to construct a sentence, 
using either verb, and to begin the sentence with any one of the pro­
nouns. No response was reinforced on these 20 trials in order to 
establish each S's operant rate for selecting the various pronouns.
On each of the 80 Training cards one of the five pronouns was 
underlined. The jj's task was to construct a sentence using either of 
the verbs and beginning with the underlined pronoun. This procedure 
of using "forced" Training trials enabled E to control or "program" 
the frequency of experience with each pronoun and, hence, the
•^The stimulus materials used on the 40 Test trials actually 
consisted of 2 3/4 x 8 1/2-inch plain white strips of paper. However, 
these materials are referred to as cards for simplicity of discussion.
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occurrence of reinforcement. That is, each time an j> in an Experi­
mental group was "forced" to use one of the underlined pronouns 
designated as "correct" in constructing a sentence, he was reinforced 
with a mild affirmatory word ("Good," "Fine," or "Mmm-hmm") at the end 
of the sentence. Each _S was reinforced for sentences beginning with 
I and WE or HE and THEY. Since all Experimental groups were initially 
reinforced at chance level (40%) on the early Training trials, it was 
important that the operant rate and the initial rate of "programmed" 
reinforcement be matched as closely as possible. In order to facili­
tate this matching the "correct" pronoun class (I and WE or HE and 
THEY) reinforced for any given on the Training trials was the one 
selected by the £5 during the operant period which most closely 
approached chance level.
The learning (reinforcement) history was "programmed" by 
using different sets of cards for each Experimental group on the 
Training trials. One group, designated as No Increase (NI), was re­
inforced at chance level (40%) over all 80 Training trials. This was 
accomplished by underlining the "correct" pronoun on eight cards 
(four each of the response class reinforced) out of every 20 Train­
ing cards within each acquisition block (see Table I). The other 
three non-reinforced pronouns were each underlined on four of the 
remaining 12 Training cards. Thus, Ss in Group NI were forced to use 
a "correct" pronoun eight times out of each 20 Training trials and, 
consequently, received eight social reinforcements. In this way, fre­
quency of selection of the "correct" pronoun class could be "programmed"
13
TABLE I
PREDETERMINED FREQUENCY OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE "CORRECT" 
RESPONSE CLASS OUT OF EVERY TWENTY TRAINING TRIALS 
ON EACH OF THE FOUR ACQUISITION BLOCKS
(Each Block Subdivided for Trend Illustration)
Acquisition Blocks Reinforcement
Experimental
Group
1 2 3 4 over trials
FHa SHb FH SH FH SH FH SH No. 1
NI 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 32 40
GI 4 4 5 6 7 7 7 8 48 60
AI 4 4 4 4 7 8 8 8 47 59
First half of each acquisition block consisting of 10 
Training trials.
^Second half of each block.
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during Training so that Ss in Group NI experienced no increase in fre­
quency above the operant level.
The predetermined frequency of experience with the "correct" 
pronoun class out of every 20 Training trials for the other two Experi­
mental groups is also shown in Table I. The 20 Training trials are 
divided in half within each acquisition block to depict more clearly 
the trend or pattern of reinforcement. Group GI experienced a gradual
i
increase in frequency beginning on Block 2 and continuing through the 
remaining blocks. The group designated as Abrupt Increase (AI) was 
similar to Group NI during the first half of acquisition. On Block 3, 
however, Group AI experienced an abrupt increase in frequency of experi­
ence with the "correct" response class. As can be seen in Table I,
Groups GI and AI received approximately the same number of reinforce­
ments over the 80 Training trials.
The Ss in the Control group were divided into three sub-groups 
of six Ss each. On the Training trials each Control sub-group correspon­
ded to one of the Experimental groups. In other words, the same set of 
Training cards used for Group NI were used for one of the Control sub­
groups, Group GI cards for one Control sub-group, and Group AI cards for 
the third sub-group. This procedure was followed on the Training trials 
to control for the possibility that an increase in frequency of the 
"correct" pronoun class alone might lead to an increase in selection of 
these prounouns on the Test trials. To provide some form of encourage­
ment for the Control S[s, reinforcement was administered randomly for a 
"correct" response on four of the 80 Training trials.
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The S/s sentence construction task on the 40 Test cards was 
the same as during the operant period. Also like the operant trials, 
no response on the Test trials was reinforced. In addition to the 
sentence construction task, j3s were instructed to write down on each 
Test card any ideas they had concerning the rule or principle for con­
structing sentences in the experiment. They were also instructed to 
indicate how certain they were of any idea they wrote down.
Conditioning Procedure
Each S, seen individually, was seated across a 3x5 ft, table 
from E in a small room. A cardboard screen, 13 in. high and 15 in. 
wide, was at one end of the table. The screen was placed between S 
and E after the instructions had been read to prevent them from 
seeing each other's writing activity. Since they could see one 
another's face, E made a concerted effort to minimize visual cues 
during the conditioning procedure. Initially £> was engaged in a few 
moments of conversation concerning his academic major, hobbies, etc. 
to establish rapport. Prior to reading the instructions, E asked SI 
if he had any prior knowledge of the experiment. If so, it was ex­
plained that he could not be used in the study but that he would 
receive an experimental point for keeping the appointment. If S, had 
no prior knowledge the following instructions were read:
This is a learning experiment. It is similar to most new ex­
periences that you have had occasion to undertake. For example, when 
you take a new course here at school you have very little knowledge 
about it at the outset. If you were tested on the first day of class
16
you probably would not do very well. But by attending lectures you 
gain knowledge about the course. This training should then help you 
when you are later tested on the lecture material.
We are going to follow this same sequence of events today. That 
is, the experiment is divided into three parts, and your task during 
each part will be to construct sentences. The first part is a Pre-test 
in which you will make up sentences prior to any training. You will 
then receive training on the task and be tested again. This Test score 
will be compared with your Pre-test score to see how much you improved 
as a result of the training. The only difference from the classroom 
situation I described is that your Test will not occur all at once at 
the end of training. Rather, testing will occur throughout the Train­
ing period and your performance will be combined into a total Test 
score at the end of the experiment.
You will notice that I have three sets of cards. (The sets 
were placed in a row in front of S. Throughout the instructions E 
pointed to the respective set each time it was mentioned.) This set 
will be used for the Pre-test sentences, this set for the Training 
sentences, and this set for the Test sentences. All of the cards have 
five pronouns typed on the top line and two simple past tense verbs 
on the second line (E showed £5 a sample card). Your task is to make 
up a sentence using one of the pronouns and one of the verbs and say 
it aloud. Always begin your sentences with the pronoun; the verb can 
be placed anywhere in the sentence you like. On the Pre-test and Test 
cards you may choose any one of the pronouns and either of the verbs
17
you like. On the Training cards, however, one of the pronouns will be 
underlined. You are to use the underlined pronoun to begin your 
sentence and either of the verbs in your sentence. Your sentences 
need not be lengthy but, at the same time, they should not be unduly
short. You will have 5 to 10 seconds to make up each sentence,
I will hand you the cards one at a time. Each card is con­
sidered a trial. After you have said your sentence aloud, place the
card face down on the table. When you have gone through all of the 
Pre-test cards we will begin with the Training cards. After every 
two Training cards I will hand you a Test card. We will repeat this 
procedure until we have gone through all of the cards. Now, do you 
have any questions up to this point?
The Training trials are intended to help you on the Test 
trials. On each Test trial you will have one other thing to do in 
addition to making up your sentence. After saying each sentence 
aloud, I would like you to write down, briefly but clearly, on the 
bottom portion of each Test card any ideas that come to you concern­
ing the way in which you think your sentences should be made up in 
this experiment. There is a rule or principle for constructing sen­
tences in this experiment and T want to see if you are able to 
determine it. Both your verbal sentences and your written ideas will 
be compared with those of other students who have participated in the 
experiment to see how well you did. Let me caution you not to become 
discouraged. It is important that you continue to apply yourself 
throughout the entire experiment.
18
It may well be that you will not have any ideas on the first 
few Test trials concerning the way in which you think your sentences 
should be made up. If so, write the word "none.” However, it is very 
important that as soon as an idea occurs to you that you write it down 
at the first opportunity you have to do so. Don't hesitate to write 
your idea down because you think it is irrelevant or foolish, or be­
cause you want to wait and try it out. Write it down when it first 
occurs to you because you can always change it later. Each time you 
write down an idea I would like for you to indicate how certain you
are of the idea. You can do this simply by checking one of the choices
(guess, uncertain, fairly certain, or very certain) typed on the bottom 
left hand side of each Test card.
Once you have written an idea down and it remains unchanged 
you may write the word "same" on each successive Test card. However, 
as you are going through the cards, an idea different from the one you 
have previously written down may occur to you. When this happens it 
is very important that you write it down as soon as it occurs to you. 
Again, let me remind you not to hesitate in writing down any ideas 
that you may have. Do you have any questions up to this point?
Now let me review. On all the cards you are to make up sen­
tences and say them aloud. Always begin your sentences with a pronoun.
On the Test cards you are also to write down your ideas concerning the 
rule or principle for constructing sentences in this experiment as 
soon as they occur to you; do not say your ideas aloud to me. Remember, 
the Training trials are intended to provide you with information to
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help you perform your two tasks on the Test cards. You will get no 
information about your Test performance until the experiment is over. 
Apply yourself throughout the experiment so that you will compare 
favorably with, or better than, other students. Once you begin, I do 
not want you to ask any questions unless you are puzzled about the 
procedure, or to make any comments until you have finished. Do you 
have any questions? (Where necessary, instructions were repeated. 
Questions concerning the purpose of the experiment were answered with 
the assurance that it would be explained afterwards.)
1 am going to place this cardboard screen between us. We will 
be able to see one another but I do not want to see what you are 
writing and, likewise, I do not want you to see what I am recording. 
Okay, let's begin.
Postconditioning Awareness Interview
Upon completion of the conditioning task, each Si was directed 
to another room where he was interviewed by a second E (hereafter re­
ferred to as the Interviewer) who had no knowledge of the group to 
which had been assigned nor of his performance on the conditioning 
task. The only information provided to the interviewer was the pro­
noun class reinforced for each j3. The El's responses were recorded 
verbatim by the interviewer. The questions used on the awareness 
interview were adapted from those used by Dulany (1962), Levin (1961)
2
^This point was emphasized to minimize the possibility of ex­
tinction occurring on the Test trials.
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and Spielberger (1962), and were modified for the present experimental 
design on the basis of a pilot study. The awareness interview is pre­
sented in Appendix A.
Upon completion of the interview the J3 was told to return to 
the room where the experiment had been conducted for an explanation. 
The E then briefly explained the purpose of the experiment, and an­
swered any questions ja posed. The was asked not to discuss the ex­
periment with other students.
Method for Assessing Awareness
The criterion of awareness used in the present study was the 
report of a correct or correlated behavioral hypothesis (Dulany, 1961; 
Dulany, 1962) which, if acted upon consistently, should lead to a 
high frequency of selection of the "correct" pronoun class. Following 
the procedure described by Dulany (1962), £>s who reported a correct 
hypothesis were classified as aware (AW), and j3s who reported a posi­
tive but imperfectly correlated hypothesis were rated as correlated 
aware (CA). The j>s who reported neither type of hypothesis were con­
sidered unaware (UA),
Ratings of awareness were made independently by E and the 
interviewer. The ratings by E were inferred from the "ideas concern­
ing the rule or principle for constructing sentences" (notes) written 
by the £3s on the Test trials. The interviewer's ratings were based 
upon the responses given by Ss during the awareness interview. With 
respect to any particular S, if the two ratings agreed, no further 
steps were taken. In cases of disagreement between E and the
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interviewer the Ss1 verbatim awareness interview protocols were submit­
ted to a judge who had no knowledge of each S's group or performance.
In addition, the judge was blind with respect to the ratings assigned 
by the first two raters. In any particular case, the final classifica­
tion (i.e., AW, CA, or UA) assigned was that agreed upon by any two of 
the three raters.
RESULTS
Ratings of Awareness
All Ss in the Control group were rated as UA by both E and 
the interviewer. The awareness ratings assigned to the 18 j3s in 
each of the Experimental groups is shown in Table II. Among the 54 
Experimental j5s, both raters (E and the interviewer) agreed perfect­
ly in rating nine j3s as AW, and agreed in classifying 33 out of 34 
Ss as UA. The one j> about whom there was disagreement was rated as 
UA by E and as CA by the interviewer. The UA classification was 
based on the fact that this J3 showed no increase in performance on 
the Test trials, and her notes revealed mainly position and order 
hypotheses. The judge's rating agreed with that of E, making a total 
of 34 UA Ss. Thus, it was concluded that the ratings of AW j3s and 
UA Ss was highly reliable.
The remaining 11 Experimental Ss were rated as CA. There was 
agreement about seven of these between E and the interviewer. Of the 
remaining three out of four jjs, E rated two as UA and one as "probably 
UA but uncertain" on the basis of the notes written by these j>s. The 
most predominant idea written by one of the j3s considered UA by E was 
that he should " . . .  make similar sentences" (unqualified). The 
other wrote that the rule or principle was to ". . . try to make a 
better and wider range of sentences." In all three of these cases 
the judge and interviewer agreed on ratings of CA, but both also felt 
that these correlated hypotheses may have been suggested to the Ss by
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TABLE II
• AWARENESS RATINGS ASSIGNED TO THE 18 Ss 
IN EACH OF THE EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS
Awareness Classification 
Correlated
Group Unaware Aware Aware
NI 11 6 1
GI 10 4 4
AI _13 JL _4
Total 34 11 9
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the awareness questionnaire. The greatest amount of difficulty in 
assigning a classification of CA, and of disagreement between the 
raters, was encountered with the remaining j3. The E assigned a rating 
of "possible CA"; the interviewer was "uncertain of a rating of UA or 
CA"; and the judge felt that this j3 was "probably UA." Again, both 
th^ judge and the interviewer felt that the awareness questionnaire 
may have exerted a suggestive influence. In summary, reliability of 
awareness ratings was considered highly satisfactory in that E and the 
interviewer agreed perfectly on 49 out of the 54 Experimental Ss, and 
in that two of the three raters agreed on four of the other five Ss.
The remaining £5 was a "toss-up" and was assigned a classification of 
CA after discussion among the raters .'
The preceding discussion attests the relative ease of assign­
ing ratings of AW and UA. Hence, the point at which the AW £3s first 
recorded a correct hypothesis was readily determined, in most cases, 
by an examination of their notes. In addition, the AW Ss were quick 
to verbalize the correct hypothesis during the awareness interview, 
usually in response to the first question. Conversely, UA _Ss typically 
wrote ideas concerned with sentence structure or grammar, with position 
preferences, with the use of active or passive verbs, with the ability 
to make a story out of the two Training cards and one Test card, etc. 
Like the AW Ss, the UA j>s tended to verbalize readily their incorrect 
hypotheses during the awareness interview and to adhere to them.
Twenty-two of the 34 UA £>s answered "No" to Question 13 ("con­
frontation" question) and one S! answered incorrectly. Thus, these 23
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Ss did not report correct or correlated hypotheses in their notes, in 
response to a detailed awareness questionnaire, nor in response to the 
confrontation question. The remaining 11 UA J3s answered Question 13 
correctly. Three of these 11 JJs were in Group NI (No Increase), three 
were in Group Al (Abrupt Increase), and five were in Group GI (Gradual 
Increase). One of the three j>s in Group NI demonstrated an increase 
in performance on the Test trials. Although answering Question 13 
correctly, she stated that she '-did not figure that out," but thought 
that E was saying "Good" only randomly as "encouragement to make better 
and more interesting sentences." The other two _Ss in Group NI did not 
show performance gains suggesting that a correct answer to the "con­
frontation" question was not indicative of an awareness that existed 
during the conditioning task. Of the three JSs in Group Al, one demon­
strated no increase in frequency of selection of the "correct" pronouns 
on the Test trials, whereas the other two showed slight increases: one
of these was clearly unaware on the basis of her responses to Questions 
1-12, and to the "confrontation" question she responded ". . .He and 
They possibly, in retrospect"; the other S said that he had tried the 
idea of pronouns out during the experiment but that . .it didn't 
work so.two trials later I wrote 'idea went down the d r a i n . O n e  of 
the five J>s in Group GI responded to Question 13 by saying " . . .  
maybe He and They." When asked by the interviewer "When did you think 
of this?," the J3 replied "Just now." With the remaining four £s in 
Group GI who answered the "confrontation" question correctly, two pos­
sible alternatives existed; (a) these _Ss were aware during the
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conditioning task and should have been classified as AW or as CA; (b) 
an awareness that did not previously exist was suggested to these E5s by 
Question 13.
On the basis of results reported by Spielberger (1962) it 
appeared that alternative (b) should be accepted. That is, Spielberger 
found that out of six jis who responded correctly to the "confrontation" 
question, five were judged to have had awareness suggested to them by 
this question. To test the possibility that awareness was suggested by 
the confrontation question in the present experiment, the performance 
of the four jis in Group GI mentioned above were compared with that of 
the other Ss in the same group. The performance data of these two sets 
of Ss, including operant trials, were subjected to a two-factor analy­
sis of variance having repeated measures (Lindquist, 1953, Type I 
design) in which Groups was the between Ss variable and Trial Blocks 
was the within £>s variable. This analysis yielded a nonsignificant 
effect of Groups (F less than unity) and a nonsignificant Groups X 
Trial Blocks interaction (F = 1.767; df = 5/40; jj> .10), indicating 
that the performance of these two sets of jJs did not differ from each 
other. These results, when considered together with the findings re­
ported by Spielberger, strongly suggest that a correct response to the 
confrontation question should not be considered indicative of a previ­
ously existing awareness, and that the rating of UA for the £>s who 
answered Question 13 correctly in the present experiment was proper.
In view of this it was concluded that there was no evidence that the 
detailed awareness interview suggested a correct or correlated
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hypothesis to _Ss who were rated as UA both on the basis of their notes 
and on their responses to the detailed questionnaire used in the pre­
sent study.
The _Ss rated as CA were quite different in their note-writing 
activity from either the aware or unaware £>s. That is, the CA j3s 
tended, as a whole, to be somewhat confused about the principle for 
constructing sentences, to record many different ideas, and to change 
their ideas frequently. Because of this, it was difficult to deter­
mine, in several cases, the point at which these j3s could be considered 
aware of a correlated hypothesis, if at all, during the acquisition 
trials. It was with these j5s that the awareness questionnaire 
appeared to provide cues that clarified the j>s* thoughts and chan­
nelized their ideas toward a correlated report. This vagueness and 
obscurity during the conditioning task raised the questions of whether 
these Ss should be rated as UA and of the extent to which cognitive 
processes could be considered to have mediated performance gains on 
the Test trials. Since Adams (1957) has pointed out, however, that 
one of the recurring limitations in experiments which reputedly have 
demonstrated conditioning without awareness has been the failure to 
eliminate the possibility that above-chance performances can be 
accounted for by correlated hypotheses, these doubtful cases were 
classified as CA.
Other Factors Related to Incidence of Awareness
Four Ss each from Group GI and Group Al were rated as AW, as 
opposed to one _S in Group NI. This tended to support the hypothesis
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that the learning of awareness would occur more frequently among J3s 
receiving an increase in reinforcement on the Training trials. How­
ever, when correlated hypotheses were considered this difference was 
negated. There were five £3s rated as CA in the two groups which re­
ceived an increase in reinforcement (Groups GI and Al) and six CA £5s
in Group NI alone. Thus, overall, there was no difference between
%
groups with respect to incidence of awareness (See Table II).
The classifications of awareness were compared with respect to 
the pronoun class reinforced. A total of 29\Ss was reinforced for 
sentences beginning with I or WE on the Training trials, and 25 Ss 
were reinforced for HE and THEY sentences. The most striking differ­
ence was between the number of jjs rated as CA. That is, reinforcement 
of I-WE responses resulted in nine Ss being classified CA as opposed 
to only two j3s reinforced for HE*-THEY responses. The UA Ss were 
evenly distributed between the two pronoun classes, and six of the 
nine AW Ss had been reinforced for HE-THEY responses.
Analysis of Performance Data
The 20 operant trials and 40 Test trials were divided into six 
blocks of 10 trials each. Unless otherwise indicated, the data from 
all six trial blocks were included in the statistical analyses reported 
below. For graphical presentation, however, the mean number of "cor­
rect" pronoun responses emitted by each group on the 20 operant trials 
was averaged to correspond to the mean number of "correct" responses 
given by each group on each of the four Test trial blocks.
The three original Experimental groups each yielded jJs
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classified as AW, CA, and UA. For purposes of analysis the nine AW £>s 
were combined into Group AW. Since the £3s in Group GI and Group Al 
each received the same number of "programmed" reinforcements on the con­
ditioning task, the one j3 rated as CA in Group Al was combined with the 
four CA Ss from Group GI. The performance of these five j3s was com­
pared with the six j3s rated as CA from Group NI by means of a two- 
factor analysis of variance having repeated measures (Lindquist, 1953,
Type I design). In this and all subsequent Type I analyses, Groups 
constituted the between-Ss factor and Trial Blocks was the within-j>s 
factor. The analysis comparing the two groups of correlated aware JJs 
yielded a nonsignificant effect of Groups (F “ .222; df ■ 1/9; £ >  .20) and 
a nonsignificant Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F = .160; df =
5/45; £ >  .20). Consequently, the two groups of Ss aware of correlated 
hypotheses were combined into Group CA. The unaware Ss in each of the 
three Experimental groups retained their original group designations 
(i.e., Groups NI, GI, and Al).
A separate single-factor analysis of variance having repeated 
measures (Lindquist, 1953, Treatments X Ss design) for each of the 
three Control sub-groups resulted in a nonsignificant effect of Trial 
Blocks for each sub-group (all Fs less than unity). The performance 
data of the three sub-groups were then compared by means of a Type I 
anova. This analysis yielded nonsignificant effects (all Fs less than 
unity) for all three factors (i.e., Groups, Trial Blocks, and Groups X 
Trial Blocks). As a result, the data for all Control Ss were combined 
into Group C for purposes of subsequent statistical analyses.
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The performances of the Control (C), Unaware (NI, GI, and Al), 
Correlated Aware (CA) and Aware (AW) groups are presented in Fig. 1,
As can be seen in Fig. 1, the mean operant rates for all groups were 
quite comparable and tended to cluster closely around chance level. An 
analysis of variance (Lindquist, 1953, Simple Randomized design) for 
the operant trials indicated that the six groups did not differ sig­
nificantly (F less than unity) during the operant period. Observation 
of Fig. 1 also indicates that the performances of the six groups 
diverged over the trial blocks. A Type I anova of the performance data 
of the six groups resulted in a significant effect of Groups (F =
11.61; df = 5/66; £  C.001) and a significant Groups X Trial Blocks 
interaction (F - 4.03; df = 25/330; £ <.001). These results indicated 
that the groups differed in frequency of selection of the "correct" 
pronouns on the Test trials, and that the slopes of the curves in Fig.
1 differed. In order to determine the source of the significant 
effects in this analysis, separate Type I analyses of variance were 
performed comparing each of the Experimental groups with Group G and 
comparing the Experimental groups with one another.
Comparisons of Experimental Groups with Control Group. When 
Group NI was compared with Group C no significant effects were found 
(all £S .20). Tests for trend (Winer, 1962) indicated that the linear 
trend was nonsignificant for Group C (F - 1.95; df = 1/85; £ >  .10) as 
well as for Group NI (F * 3.99; df = 1/50; £ >  .05). All other trends 
were also nonsignificant. Thus, as predicted, the group performance 
of unaware _Ss who received no increase in "programmed" reinforcement
M
EA
N 
N
U
M
B
ER
 
C
O
R
R
EC
T"
 
PR
O
N
O
U
N
 
R
E
S
P
O
N
S
E
S
31
* UNAWARE GROUPS
AW
* C
OP 42 3
T E S T  T R IA L  BLOCKS
Fig. 1. Performance Curves of Aware (AW), Correlated Aware (CA), 
Unaware (NI, GI, Al) and Control (C) Groups.
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was not significantly altered and was no different from that of Control 
Ss.
The anova comparing Group GI with Group C yielded a significant 
Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F = 3.33; dj: *» 5/130; £ <.01) indi­
cating that the performance curves of these two groups diverged over 
trials. As can be observed in Fig. 1, Group GI showed a gradual in­
crease in performance over trial blocks corresponding to the '’programmed" 
increase in reinforcement. A Fest' for linear trend was significant 
beyond the .001 level of probability (F = 14.75; df ■ 1/45). When the 
performance data of the two groups on the final trial block were com­
pared by means of an analysis of variance (Lindquist, 1953, Simple 
Randomized design), it was found that Group GI .Ss constructed signifi­
cantly more Test sentences beginning with the "correct" pronouns than 
did the Control JJs (F = 8.56; df * 1/26; £ <.01). Further evidence 
that the unaware £>s in Group GI showed significant performance gains 
came from a test of the difference between the operant and trial block 
4 group means (t ■ 2.960; df = 9; £ <.02).
As may be noted in Fig. 1, Group Al showed a gradual improve­
ment in performance on trial blocks 1 and 2, followed by a greater in­
crease in emission of the "correct" pronouns on trial block 3. A test 
of the difference between the operant and trial block 1 group means 
was nonsignificant, but a highly significant difference was found be­
tween the operant and trial block 3 means (t = 3.942; df = 12; £ <.01).
It was on trial block 3 that Ss in Group Al first experienced an in­
crease in "programmed" reinforcement, suggesting a rather direct
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relationship between reinforcement and performance gains. Tests for 
trend yielded a significant linear trend (F = 19.58; df = 1/60;
<.001) and a significant cubic trend (F = 4.49; df = 1/60; £  <.05) 
indicating that both the increase and the changing rate of increase 
were significant over all trial blocks. The comparison between Group 
Al and Group C by analysis of variance resulted in a significant 
effect of Groups (F = 8.29; df = 1/29; £ <.01) and a significant 
Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F ** 5.04; df = 5/145; £ <.005).
These results, when considered together with Fig. 1, indicate that 
Group AX showed a greater increase of "correct” pronoun responses from 
its operant rate than did Group C. Similar results were obtained when 
Group CA and Group AW were each compared with Group C.
In summary, the preceding analyses indicated that, with the 
exception of jls in Group NI, the group performance of unaware, corre­
lated aware, and aware jSs each differed significantly from the per­
formance of Control Ss. Comparisons were then made between 
Experimental groups.
Experimental Groups Compared with One Another. As can be ob­
served in Fig. 1, the performance of aware J3s was strikingly different 
from that of correlated aware and unaware J3s. This difference was 
confirmed by two separate Type I analyses of variance comparing Group 
AW with Group CA, and with Groups GI and Al. (That is, Groups AW,
GI, and Al were compared in a single analysis of variance since it was 
predicted that unaware ^s in Groups GI and Al would demonstrate perfor­
mance gains, and since Group NI was found to be no different from the
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Control Group.) The anova between Group AW and Group CA resulted in 
significant effects on all factors: Groups (F ■ 5.53; df ® 1/18;
£ <.05); Trial Blocks (F = 21.42; df ■ 5/90; £ <.001); and Groups X 
Trial Blocks (F *» 3.80; df = 5/90; £ <.005). Thus, Sis reporting corre­
lated hypotheses constructed significantly fewer Test sentences begin­
ning with "correct" pronouns than did the aware . Similarly, all 
effects were significant in the comparison between Group AW and Groups 
GI and Al.
The difference between aware and unaware jJs was not expected 
and was in agreement with previous studies. Of considerable interest, 
however, was the fact that the performance of _Ss reporting correlated 
hypotheses also differed significantly from that of aware Ss. The 
practice in most previous studies has been to classify j>s who reported 
correlated hypotheses as aware, to combine their performance data with 
aware Ss, and to consider them as distinctly different from unaware 
Ss. Yet, when the performance data of the correlated aware Ss (Group 
CA) and the unaware Ss (Groups GI and Al) were subjected to a Type I 
anova, a nonsignificant effect of Groups (F » 1.32; df ■ 2/31; £ >  .20) 
and a nonsignificant Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F = 1.27; 
df = 10/155; £>.20) were found. Thus, the Test performance of unaware 
Ss in the present experiment who received an increase in "programmed" 
reinforcement on the Training trials did not differ from that of £3s 
aware of correlated hypotheses.
Performance of Aware Ss prior to and after Reports of Awareness
According to the cognitive formulation of Spielberger and
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DeNike (1966), performance gains do not occur in verbal operant condi­
tioning in the absence of a "confirmed" (presumably either correct or 
correlated) hypothesis (p. 320), That is, prior to confirmation an S 
may be trying out various hypotheses and modifying them based upon 
information provided by the reinforcer. However, an increased output 
of the reinforced response class, when it occurs, is the result 
(italics added) of a confirmed hypothesis. For example, DeNike (1964) 
found that " . . .  although aware j>s indicated in the interview that 
they became aware on the average about one trial block before that on 
which they recorded their correct hypotheses, no performance gains 
were found prior to the trial block on which these Ss wrote correct 
hypotheses in their notes" (p. 528).
To investigate the sequence of events posited by Spielberger 
and DeNike (1966), j5s in the present experiment were asked to indicate, 
on each Test trial, how certain they were of the idea they had written 
concerning the rule or principle for constructing sentences. This was 
done by Ss checking one of four choices (i.e., guess, uncertain, fairly 
certain or certain) typed on each Test card. The Test trial on which 
each of the nine aware Ss indicated that he was "certain" of the rule 
or principle was taken as the point of a confirmed hypothesis. (As 
mentioned above, this was difficult to determine in many cases with 
Ss classified as correlated aware. Hence, only j>s rated as AW are 
analyzed under this heading.)
For purposes of this analysis the performance data of the nine 
aware Ss on the 40 Test trials were divided into eight blocks of five
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trials each. The jjs recorded the correct principle (confirmed hypoth­
esis) in their notes on different Test trials. These reports varied 
from trial 14 to trial 34, with a mean of 23.7 trials. In terms of 
trial blocks, this corresponded to a range of 3 to 7 blocks, and a 
mean of 5.11 trial blocks. Eight of the nine j3s showed a performance 
gain prior to the trial block on which a confirmed hypothesis was 
first recorded in their notes. With respect to "programmed" rein­
forcement, five of the nine j3s first wrote their hypotheses on trial 
blocks subsequent to an increase in reinforcement, two wrote them on 
a trial block concomitant with an increase in reinforcement, and two 
prior to any increase in reinforcement.
The performance data of the aware Ss were Vincentized (Munn, 
1950) so that the trial block on which each first recorded a con­
firmed hypothesis could be aligned with respect to the same reference 
point. Since the mean trial block on which the aware jJs first re­
corded a confirmed hypothesis was 5.11, and the average number of 
trial blocks prior to these reports was 4.11, trial block 5 was de­
signated as the "aware" trial block in a manner similar to that 
described by DeNike (1964). Each ^ 's performance data on the "pre- 
aware" trial blocks (i.e., trial blocks prior to the block on which 
the confirmed hypothesis was recorded) were Vincentized into Vincent 
fourths; the data subsequent to the block on which the report 
occurred were averaged into Vincent thirds.
Figure 2 presents the Vincentized performance curve of the 
nine aware £>s prior to and after the "aware" trial block designated
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Fig. 2. Vincentized Performance Curve for Nine Aware £5s.
Trial Block 5 Represents the Point at which Aware £>s First Recorded 
Correct Hypotheses with a High Degree of Certainty (Confirmed).
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as trial block 5. In Fig. 2 the mean number of "correct" pronoun re­
sponses emitted on the 20 operant trials was averaged. For purposes of 
statistical analyses, however, the 20 operant trials were divided into 
four blocks of 5 trials each, corresponding to the Test trial blocks. 
This set of group data will henceforth be referred to as Group AW-5.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the performance of this group showed a slight 
increase in the mean number of "correct" pronouns on trial block 1 
over the operant rate, and remained at that level on trial blocks 2 
and 3. A rather sharp increase occurred on the final "preaware" 
trial block (block 4) followed by a decrease on the "aware" trial 
block.
An analysis of variance (Lindquist, 1953, Treatments X Ss 
design) of the performance data prior to the "aware" trial block 
yielded a significant effect of trial blocks (F = 5.53; df = 7/56;
£  <.001), indicating that Group AW-5 selected the "correct" pronouns 
with a significantly greater frequency on the "preaware" Test trials 
than during the operant period. This difference was confirmed by a t 
test between the operant and trial block 4 group means which was sig­
nificant beyond the .001 level of probability (t «* 4.699; df 8).
The mean number of "correct" pronouns emitted on trial block 4 was 
significantly greater than on trial block 3 (J: - 3.105; df = 8;
£  <.02). No difference was found between trial blocks 4 and 5, nor 
between the operant level and trial block 1. The data for the operant 
and "preaware" trial blocks were subjected to a trend analysis (Winer, 
1962) which indicated significant linear (F “ 23.70; df = 1/56; £  <.001)
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and quadratic (F = 9.22; df ** 1/56; £<.001) components. Thus, both 
the increase and the changing rate of increase were statistically sig­
nificant over the "preaware" trial blocks. When considered together 
with Fig. 2, these results support the overall prediction that signifi­
cant performance gains can occur prior to, or in the absence of, the 
learning of awareness as a function of reinforced practice.
Reanalysis of Performance Data of Aware Ss
Since it was possible that the significant "preaware" perfor­
mance gains were mediated by a lesser degree of certainty of correct 
or correlated hypotheses, the data of the nine aware £>s were reanalyzed 
using a more liberal criterion of awareness. For this analysis the 
criterion for the "aware" trial block was set as the block on which 
each £> first indicated in his notes that he was "fairly certain" of a 
correct or correlated hypothesis. This meant, then, that the ideas 
recorded by the aware Ss during the "preaware" trial blocks could not 
be considered indicative of anything more than what Spielberger and 
DeNike (1966) have referred to as ", . . a  tentative formulation of 
the correct (and presumably correlated) hypothesis" (p. 320). The 
notes of each aware j3 were re-examined, and the results are presented 
in Table III. As the Table indicates, three j3s (Nos. 5, 6, and 9) did 
not meet the criterion of "fairly certain" on what might be considered 
to have been their earliest "aware" trial block (based on raw data). 
Instead, they were conceptualizing at an even lower level of certainty 
on the "aware" trial block. That is, all three of these j3s recorded 
correlated hypotheses on the "aware" block,but one indicated that he
\
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF IDEAS RECORDED BY AWARE Ss ON THE AWARE 
AND PREAWARE TRIAL BLOCKS AND PERFORMANCE 
ON THE PREAWARE BLOCKS (RAW DATA)
Aware
Trial
Block
Type Hypothesis and Level of Certainty on Perf. Gains 
on Preaware 
Blockss Aware Trial Block Preaware Blocks
1 4 correct - fairly cert. correct - uncert. Yes
2 4 II I T II correl. - uncert. 
mixed with in­
correct ideas
No
3 5 I T I I II incorrect Yes
4 5 n ii ii n No
5 5 correl. - guess i i Yes
6 4 i i  ii none Yes
7 2 correct - fairly cert. correl. - uncert. 
followed by ’’now 
I'm not sure"
Yes
8 4 correl. - fairly cert. incorrect Yes
9 2 correl. - uncertain correl. - guess No
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was "uncertain" of his idea, and the other two indicated that their 
hypotheses were "guesses." Subsequent to these ideas the three jjs 
recorded confirmed hypotheses, thus skipping the intermediate steps in 
formulating the rule or principle. Four of the nine j>s recorded in­
correct hypotheses on the "preaware" trial blocks and one ji recorded 
no hypotheses. With respect to performance gains, six of the nine 
£s demonstrated an increase in frequency of the "correct" pronouns 
during the "preaware" trial blocks. The relation between an increase 
in "programmed" reinforcement and the "aware" trial block was not 
shown in Table III because of lack of space. Examination of the j>s' 
notes revealed that the "aware" block was subsequent to an increase 
in reinforcement for two j3s, concomitant with the reinforcement in­
crease for three J3s, and prior to the "programmed" increase for four 
_Ss.
The performance data of the nine aware j3s were Vincentized 
(Munn, 1950) in the manner described above. The mean "aware" trial 
block of the raw data was 3.89, and the average number of "preaware" 
blocks was 2.89. Thus, trial block 4 was designated as the "aware" 
trial block for purposes of weighting each _S's performance data.
The "preaware" trial blocks were Vincentized into Vincent thirds; the 
performance data subsequent to trial block 4 were averaged into 
Vincent fourths. This set of Vincentized group data, shown in Fig. 3, 
will hereafter be referred to as Group AW-4. Statistical analyses of 
these data confirmed the following facts which may be observed in 
Fig. 3: (a) The Vincentized curve shows that performance was
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Correct or Correlated Hypotheses with a Lower Degree of Certainty 
(Fairly Certain or Less).
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inconsistent on trial blocks 1 and 2 followed by a noticeable rise on 
trial block 3. On all subsequent trial blocks the curve shows a 
gradual increase in emission of the mean number of "correct" pronouns. 
An anova (Treatments X j3s design) of the group data, including operant 
trials, yielded a significant effect of trials beyond the .001 level 
of probability (F => 6.63; df * 11/88); (b) When the performance data 
for the operant trials and the "preaware" trial blocks (1-3) were 
subjected to an analysis of variance, the effect of trial blocks was 
found to be significant (F “ 2.78; df = 6/48; £  <.05), indicating that 
Group AW-4 selected the "correct" pronouns with a significantly 
greater frequency on the "preaware" Test trials than during the 
operant period. Further, the mean number of "correct" pronouns 
emitted was significantly greater on trial block 3 than during the 
operant period (J: = 2.918; jif = 8; £ <.02), but no difference was 
found between the operant period and trial block 1 (£ = 1.583; 
df = 8; £>,10). A trend analysis of the operant and "preaware" 
trial blocks yielded significant linear (F = 8.03; df = 1/48; £  <.01) 
and quadratic components (F = 5.20; df = 1/48; £  <.05) which, when 
considered together with the other results, indicated that both the 
increase and the changing rate of increase were significant over the 
"preaware" trial blocks; (c) The difference between the group means 
of trial blocks 3 and 8 was significant at the .05 level of probabil­
ity (t = 2.325; df = 8), indicating that further performance gains 
occurred subsequent to the "preaware" trial blocks. Thus, even when 
using a less exacting estimate of awareness, the overall prediction
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that significant performance gains can occur prior to the learning of 
awareness as a function of reinforced practice was supported.
Other Factors Related to Performance
Male and female jJs within each awareness classification (i.e., 
UA, CA, and AW) were compared to determine whether there was a differ­
ential effect of sex on performance. Type I analyses of variance were 
used for these comparisons. In Group CA and Group AW males performed 
better than females but the effect of Groups (Sex) as well as the 
Groups X Trial Blocks interaction were nonsignificant in both analyses. 
On the other hand, unaware females performed somewhat better than un­
aware males. The analysis of variance yielded a nonsignificant effect 
of Groups and a significant Groups X Trial Blocks interaction (F =
2.82; df = 5/160; £  <.025) indicating that, while the two sexes re­
sponded differentially over trials, the unaware female jJs did not 
show a greater increase in frequency of "correct" pronouns from the 
initial operant level than the unaware male Ss. Considering the 
results of all the groups together, it appeared that sex exerted no 
differential effect on performance in the present study.
Within each awareness classification, the effect on performance 
of the pronoun class reinforced was also compared. In each classifica­
tion j3s reinforced for constructing sentences beginning with HE or 
THEY performed better than £3s reinforced with the other pronoun class 
(I or WE). Three separate Type I analyses of variance comparing the 
two pronoun classes within each awareness classification were
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performed. These analyses yielded in each case a nonsignificant effect 
of Groups (Pronoun Class) and a nonsignificant Groups X Trial Blocks 
interaction. It was concluded, then, that the pronoun class reinforced 
had no differential effect on the performance of S,s in this experiment.
DISCUSSION
In order to obviate the criticism of inadequate methods used 
for determining awareness directed against early verbal conditioning 
studies which reported conditioning without awareness, ratings of 
awareness in the present experiment were carefully assessed indepen­
dently from the notes written by £3s on the Test trials and from a 
detailed postconditioning interview. Utilizing such a method, the 
overall prediction that significant performance gains can occur in a 
verbal operant conditioning paradigm prior to or in the absence of 
the learning of awareness was clearly supported by the results. These 
results were contrary to the findings reported by cognitive investi­
gators (DeNike, 1964; Dulany, 1962; Levin, 1961; Spielberger, 1962; 
Spielberger, ut a_l., 1966) who assessed awareness from notes and/or 
detailed questionnaires in essentially the same manner. In general, 
these cognitive investigators reported that performance gains were 
found only for aware j3s and that these gains were subsequent to the 
learning of awareness. On the other hand, the present results were 
in agreement with those of Dixon and Oakes (1965) who used a detailed 
questionnaire for inferring awareness. Dixon and Oakes found that 
when Ss were engaged in a color naming task between verbal condition­
ing trials, this intertrial activity interfered with the learning of 
awareness. Yet the unaware j3s demonstrated significant performance 
gains as a function of reinforced practice and were no different from 
Ss not engaged in color naming and who were able to verbalize correct 
hypotheses.
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Assuming that the use of similar methods and criteria for 
assessing awareness led to similar judgments in the present study and 
in those of the cognitive investigators mentioned above, the contradic­
tory findings would appear to be due to other differences in methodol­
ogy, to the interpretations of the results which the methodology 
permitted and to theoretical biases. Interpretations of results have 
been primarily concerned with the antecedent conditions of behavior 
change. Cognitive investigators have stressed the learning of aware­
ness as the essential antecedent condition of performance gains.
Without awareness conditioning does not occur. While agreeing that 
the learning of awareness may facilitate behavior change, reinforce­
ment psychologists have denied the unique status assigned to awareness 
by the cognitive investigators and have maintained, instead, that 
reinforcement is both a necessary and sufficient condition of perfor­
mance gains in verbal conditioning. The results of the present 
experiment will be discussed in terms of these two alternative view­
points and in terms of the methodological differences which may have 
accounted for the contradictory findings.
A major premise at the outset of the study was that £s respond 
differentially to the same social reinforcement and that it is the j>s1 
reinforcement history on the verbal conditioning task itself that is 
crucial for performance gains and the learning of awareness if it 
occurs at all. Four hypotheses were formulated to test this assump­
tion.
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Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1, that the frequency of "correct" pronoun responses 
of unaware j>s would not be significantly altered on the Test trials 
when "programmed" reinforcement did not increase above operant 
(chance) level, was confirmed. The performance of Experimental jSs 
rated as unaware who received reinforcement at a level which corre­
sponded to their operant rate did not differ from Control J3s. This 
finding was supported by statistical analyses and is clearly shown in 
Fig. 1 (Group NI). These unaware Ss did show a gradual, albeit 
slight, increment in emission of the "correct" pronouns over trials. 
Dulany (1962) has referred to these nonsignificant increases by un­
aware Ss as ", . . time-correlated increases . , . that would seem to 
be the manifestations of prior habit" (p. 117), released by situa­
tional cues ". . .in transfer--involuntarily" (p. 109). In the 
present study the situational cues were the same for Experimental 
and Control £is,with the exception of frequency of experience with 
reinforcement. The fact that unaware j3s in Group NI (reinforced at 
chance level) showed slight performance gains whereas Control J3s 
did not suggests that reinforcement is a parameter that must be dealt 
with when considering performance gains in verbal conditioning situa­
tions .
Hypothesis 2
That the amount of reinforcement was related to the performance 
gains of unaware Ss can be observed in Fig. 1. Only the unaware £s 
who received an increase in "programmed" reinforcement (Groups GI and
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AI) which rose above operant (chance) level showed significant perfor­
mance gains, confirming Hypothesis 2. An unexpected finding was the 
relationship between the trend of performance of unaware Ss and the 
pattern or trend of "programmed" reinforcement. Subjects who received 
a gradual increase in reinforcement demonstrated gradual performance 
gains. A striking relationship between the pattern of reinforcement 
and performance gains was found in Group AI. That is, significant 
performance gains first occurred on the trial block in which the j3s in 
Group AI first received an abrupt increase in "programmed" reinforce­
ment. Thus, the performance gains of S b who received increases in 
reinforcement appeared to be a direct function of the j>s1 reinforce­
ment histories in terms of the amount of reinforcement and the manner 
or pattern In which it was experienced. Spielberger and DeNike (1966) 
have stated that the pattern and amount of reinforcement may facili­
tate the development of hypotheses leading to awareness. This sequence 
of events is based on the assumption that the reinforcing stimulus 
provides information which gives rise to cognitive states (hypotheses) 
but has no effect upon performance in the absence of a correct or 
correlated hypothesis. The fact that the performance gains of unaware 
Ss co-varied with "programmed" reinforcement in the present experi­
ment implies, instead, that the amount and pattern of reinforcement 
should be considered as performance variables. This finding of a co- 
varying relationship would appear to be consistent with reinforcement 
interpretations of verbal conditioning (Krasner, 1962; Postman and 
Sassenrath, 1961; Verplanck, 1962), which contend that performance
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gains initially result from the direct and automatic strengthening 
effects of reinforcement, and suggests that until a change in rein­
forcement is experienced by J3s who remain unaware, performance gains 
are not likely to occur.
Hypothesis 3
The group performance gains demonstrated by aware Ss on the 
"preaware" trial blocks also supported the overall prediction that 
significant performance increases can occur prior to the learning of 
awareness as a function of reinforced practice. Hypothesis 3, that 
the learning of awareness would occur as a consequence of the in­
crease in "programmed" reinforcement, tended to be supported only 
when a rigorous criterion of awareness was employed. That is, 78% 
of the Ss first recorded their correct hypotheses subsequent to, or 
concomitant with, an increase in "programmed" reinforcement. When a 
less exacting measure of awareness was used, this proportion dropped 
to 56%, indicating that Hypothesis 3 was less clearly supported.
This meant, in turn, that most of the aware f3s demonstrated perfor­
mance gains prior to an increase in "programmed" reinforcement. The 
direct relationship between performance gains and "programmed" rein­
forcement found with unaware j3s was not evident in the performance 
gains of aware Ss on the "preaware" trial blocks, suggesting that Ss 
who learned awareness in the present experiment were qualitatively 
different, in some way, from those who did not. As assessed by the 
postconditioning awareness interview motivation was probably not a 
factor. That is, unaware j3s, in general, tried as hard and wanted to
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receive reinforcement as much as aware Ss. One thing was certain: 
the Ss who subsequently learned awareness conditioned more readily in 
response to lesser amounts of reinforcement than did j3s who remained 
unaware. This would seem to indicate that individual differences in 
responsivity to social reinforcement play a significant part in verbal 
conditioning experiments. Such an interpretation is consistent with 
the position of Baron (1966) and Kanfer and McBrearty (1961) that 
social reinforcers do not have the same strengthening effect on all 
Ss.
The finding of significant performance gains prior to reports 
of awareness was in agreement with those reported by Philbrick and 
Postman (1955) and Postman and Sassenrath (1961) but contrary to the 
results obtained by DeNike (1964) and Spielberger, et aJL. (1966).
These latter investigators found no tendency for the performance of 
Ss who subsequently learned awareness to increase on the "preaware" 
trial blocks; performance gains first occurred on the trial block in 
which jJs first recorded their correct hypotheses in their notes.
DeNike and Spielberger, et: al. concluded that the close temporal re­
lationship between the learning of awareness and the inception of 
performance gains supported the hypothesis that the performance gains 
occurring on the "aware" trial block were mediated by cognitive 
processes. The J3s in these two experiments, however, recorded their 
correct hypotheses only at the end of the "aware" block which con­
sisted of 25 and 23 trials respectively. Thus, the conclusion by 
these cognitive investigators that the performance gains on the
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"aware” block occurred only after the Ss became aware requires the 
additional assumption that awareness was learned relatively early in 
the "aware" block. DeNike and Spielberger, el: al. present, however, 
no evidence to substantiate this presumed necessary condition.
The results of the present study and those of Philbrick and 
Postman (1955) suggest that the hypothesized temporal relationship of 
the cognitive psychologist is an artifact of an insensitive method­
ology for obtaining reports of awareness during the conditioning task. 
Philbrick and Postman stopped j3s at the end of every block of nine 
trials in which jSs gave evidence of responding at a significantly 
better than chance level (four or more "correct" responses), and 
asked them to state the principle on which they were basing their 
responses. It was found that, for the entire group, there was an 
average of 4.25 blocks between correct statement of the principle and 
the first time the criterion was reached. In addition, the perfor­
mance curve showed a positive acceleration as the point of verbaliza­
tion ("aware" trial block) was approached.
In the present study, reports concerning the rule or principle 
for constructing sentences were obtained on every Test trial. With 
this method the progressive formulation of hypotheses recorded by Sis 
and the degree of confidence associated with each one could be 
readily determined by an examination of the _Ss' notes. By plotting 
the performance data of the aware £>s in blocks of five trials each, 
a far more precise analysis of the temporal relationship between per­
formance and awareness could be made. Even when the "aware" trial
53
block was determined on the basis of a less exacting criterion of 
awareness than a confirmed hypothesis, the £s who subsequently learned 
awareness demonstrated significant performance gains prior to reports 
of awareness. As Fig. 3 indicates, if j3s in Group AW-4 had been asked 
to record their ideas only after every ten trials, reports of aware­
ness would have first occurred at the end of trial block 4. Such a 
procedure would have lent itself to the erroneous conclusion that the 
performance gains that occurred on the immediately preceding 10 
trials were cognitively mediated. In view of this, it would appear 
that the conclusion reached by both DeNike (1964) and Spielberger, et 
al. (1966) that performance gains in verbal conditioning are mediated 
by cognitive processes was unwarranted and an artifact of the method­
ology employed during the conditioning task for determining the 
temporal relationship between performance gains and awareness.
The position of Krasner and Ullmann (1963) and other behavioral 
psychologists that performance and awareness are both dependent vari­
ables which can be modified directly by reinforcement was supported by 
the results of the present study. These results, when considered 
together with those of Philbrick and Postman (1955), Postman and — - 
Sassenrath (1961) and Dixon and Oakes (1965), suggest that reinforce­
ment exerts a differential effect upon these two dependent variables. 
It would appear that reinforcement predominantly influences perfor­
mance, so that performance gains may be expected to precede in time 
the learning of awareness. This interpretation is consistent with 
that of Postman and Sassenrath (1961) who have stated that " . . .
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since verbalization often occurs after a period of systematic improve­
ment, verbalization of a principle may be considered at the same time 
a result of past improvement and a condition of further improvement’1 
(p. 124). This is not to say that verbalization can occur only after 
an improvement in performance but that this is the most probable 
sequence of events. Such was the case in the present experiment; as 
can be seen in Table III, two-thirds of the aware j3s demonstrated 
performance gains prior to reports of awareness whereas one-third did 
not. Thus, while awareness may precede performance gains in verbal 
conditioning in some instances, present evidence supports the position 
of Postman and Sassenrath that the opposite is most likely to occur.
Hypothesis 4
This hypothesis, that the learning of awareness would occur 
more often among j3s receiving an increase in "programmed" reinforce­
ment than among j3s receiving no increase, was not accepted. Consider­
ing only j>s rated as aware, the hypothesis was supported. But when 
Ss rated as correlated aware were considered, it was found that more 
jjs in the group receiving no increase in reinforcement reported 
awareness than jjs in the groups receiving the "programmed" increase.
In any event, the finding that aware learned awareness prior to 
an increase in "programmed" reinforcement rendered Hypothesis 4 vapid.
Ratings made from Notes and Awareness Interview
It was concluded that the notes written by jjs during the con­
ditioning task concerning the rule or principle for constructing
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sentences in the present experiment could reliably be used for assign­
ing ratings of aware or unaware. This was generally true for j3s rated 
as correlated aware, although in some cases a determination could not 
be made from the notes alone. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was confirmed. This 
finding was in agreement with DeNike (1964) who concluded that note 
writing and interview techniques appeared to ". . . yield essentially 
comparable results in distinguishing between aware and unaware £3s, 
and that the biasing effects introduced by interviewing £3s after the 
conditioning period are not large" (p. 528).
The fact that there was no difficulty in rating Ss as unaware 
on the basis of their notes or responses to the detailed postcondi­
tioning questionnaire in the present study, and the finding of no 
tendency for the questionnaire to suggest a correct or correlated 
hypothesis to unaware j>s would appear to have important implica­
tions for an unexpected finding reported by Levin (1961). Levin found 
that 13 Ss classified as unaware of a correct contingency had also 
been unaware of the reinforcer. They did not spontaneously mention 
during the interview that E had said "Good" during the conditioning 
trials, yet these J3s showed as much conditioning as the aware group. 
Levin attempted to explain this discrepancy as possibly due to an 
artifact in his interviewing procedure. Questions 8 through 10 were 
designed to investigate the S/s awareness of the reinforcer, and, 
when £3 still had not mentioned at the end of Question 10 that the JS 
had said "Good" during the trials, the interview was terminated since 
all the remaining questions included wording to the effect that E had
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in fact said "Good." Levin concluded: "It is possible that these j»s
misunderstood question 10 and might have realized a correct contin­
gency had they been interviewed further" (1961, p. 73),
Such a conclusion seems to be highly speculative since both 
questions 9 and 10 used by Levin were quite pointed as to E's activ­
ity during the conditioning trials. That is, Question 10 asked "Were 
you aware that I said anything?" (Levin, 1961, p. 68). In the present 
experiment only one j> could not answer this question correctly; she 
remembered that E had said something but not sure what it was. It 
was pointed out to her by the interviewer that E had said "Good," and 
the interview continued; she was unable to answer the confrontation 
question. On the basis of both her notes and the entire question­
naire she was clearly unaware. Yet this S, like the ones in the 
Levin (1961) study, demonstrated performance gains. Admittedly an N 
of one is a rather small sample from which to generalize. But since 
this type of j3--i.e., one who was unaware of the reinforcer--has been 
encountered so infrequently in studies where j3s have been carefully 
interviewed, a sample of one may be representative. This case, when 
considered with the findings of DeNike (1964) and of the present 
study (that j3s who were unaware during the conditioning task remained 
unaware during the postconditioning interview, and that j3s rated 
as correlated aware were not lacking in ideas and, at bottom, knew 
that IS had said "Good"), implies that the 13 j5s in Levin's study 
were, in fact, unaware. There should be no need for the interviewer 
to have to make a supposedly aware j3 aware that E had occasionally
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said ’’Good." To argue otherwise is to beg the question.
Correlated Hypotheses
Farber (1963) has suggested that cognitively oriented investi­
gators, in their eagerness to attribute behavior to conscious mediating 
processes, might sometimes inadvertently suggest, or erroneously infer, 
awareness in questioning jis who demonstrated performance gains. Re­
sults of the present experiment indicated that a detailed question­
naire increased the probability of correlated hypotheses being suggested 
to Ss. In some cases, the previous existence of such hypotheses could 
have been seriously challenged on the basis of notes written by the £>s 
during the conditioning task, irrespective of their performance. How­
ever, Spielberger and Levin (1962) have argued that performance gains 
in verbal conditioning are presumptive evidence for awareness. While 
granting that the use of a detailed postconditioning interview un­
doubtedly increased the probability of awareness having been suggested 
to some of their j3s, Spielberger and Levin maintained, nevertheless, 
that
. . . only Ss who verbalized a correct response-reinforcement 
contingency showed acquisition of the reinforced response.
Therefore, an inescapable implication of the findings of the 
present study is that verbalization of awareness is an impor­
tant empirical variable in verbal conditioning irrespective 
of whether the j5s1 verbal reports are interpreted as indicating 
awareness during the conditioning trials or awareness suggested 
by the cues of the postconditioning interview [italics added]
(1962, pp. 130-131).
That there may often be a correlation between performance gains
and awareness has not been denied and, in fact, evidence for such a
relationship has been reported by behaviorally oriented investigators
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(e.g., Krasner and Ullmann, 1963; Matarazzo, Saslow, and Parels, 1960). 
Nonetheless, ", . . a  positive correlation between the two does not 
necessarily imply that awareness mediates conditionability" (Krasner 
and Ullmann, 1963, p. 201). If, on the other hand, Spielberger and 
Levin (1962) are saying that, regardless of how the reports of aware­
ness are obtained (i.e., whether they are— suggested or not), the 
presence of performance gains means that these gains had to be cogni­
tively mediated, then such a statement would appear to be circular 
reasoning. By rigidly adhering to a theoretical bias which maintains 
that awareness must precede conditioning, Spielberger and Levin have 
been forced to present the consequent condition (performance) as 
evidence for its presumed antecedent condition (awareness).
Dulany (1961) has maintained that, in an experiment where the 
"correct" response class has been designated as plural nouns, a re­
port by an S of "I am supposed to associate in a series when you say 
'Umhmmm111 should be considered as a correlated hypothesis for "I am 
supposed to say plural nouns" (p. 260). Evidence obtained from the 
data of Ss classified as correlated aware in the present experiment 
suggests, however, that Dulany's assumption may sometimes be an 
overstatement leading to erroneous judgments of awareness for £>s 
who demonstrated performance gains. For example, an £5 who was rein­
forced for I-WE sentences in the present experiment wrote in her 
notes that the rule for constructing sentences was " . . .  whether we 
relate the sentences to our own experiences." This type of verbal 
report is considered by cognitive investigators (as well as in the
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present experiment) as prima facie evidence of a correlated hypothesis 
meaning "I was supposed to begin my sentences with ’ I'" because J3s 
who report such hypotheses typically demonstrate performance gains. 
Ironically, the j> in the present experiment, although appropriately 
motivated, did not show a performance gain. This £5 identified the 
"correct" pronoun class in response to Question 12a (after which pro­
nouns did E say "Good?") but said she had not written that in her 
notes because "I didn't think of it in that way--I thought about sen­
tences relating to self." Obviously for this the hypothesis of 
relating sentences "to myself" had an entirely different meaning from 
that of beginning sentences with "I." Although correlated theoreti­
cally, it was, in fact, incorrect. Otherwise, according to cognitive 
theory this j3 would have shown acquisition of the "correct" pronoun.
But what if this j> had demonstrated performance gains? Would 
it then be valid to infer that the increase was cognitively mediated? 
To do so, it seems, would necessitate the assumption that the £3 was 
trying to tell us what we wanted to hear but couldn't get the idea 
across since, logically and statistically, such reports should be 
correlated with the "correct" response class. On the other hand, 
could the (hypothesized) increase have been the result of the direct 
and automatic strengthening effect of reinforcement? The results of 
the present experiment would support such an interpretation. That 
is, Ss reporting incorrect hypotheses who received an increase in -
"programmed" reinforcement demonstrated significant performance 
gains. Conversely, _Ss who did not receive an increase did not differ
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from Control _Ss. Interestingly enough, the S under discussion was in 
the group which received no increase in "programmed" reinforcement, con­
firming the impression that her apparent correlated hypothesis was 
deceptive.
Although correlated hypotheses have long been recognized as a 
likely source of contamination in studies reporting conditioning with­
out awareness (Adams, 1957), surprisingly little attention has been 
devoted to them in the literature. The findings of the present study, 
that: (a) notes can be reliably used for rating awareness of correct
and incorrect hypotheses but not correlated hypotheses; (b) Ss who 
develop correct hypotheses during the conditioning task readily ver­
balize them early in the postconditioning interview whereas presum­
ably aware of correlated hypotheses often are perplexed in their note 
writing and in the interview; (c) correlated hypotheses are likely to 
be suggested to these £s by extensive postconditioning interviews; 
and, (d) reports of apparent correlated hypotheses do not always mean 
what the interviewer interprets them to mean, indicate that the range 
of behaviors encompassed by correlated hypotheses is broad and ambigu­
ous. Of greatest interest was the unexpected finding that the perfor­
mance of Ss reporting correlated hypotheses did not differ from that 
of unaware _Ss. The fact that the performance of the former was more 
like that of unaware jjs than like Ss reporting correct hypotheses 
strongly suggests that correlated hypotheses may often not be indi­
cative of an awareness that existed during the conditioning task. In 
other words, since correlated hypotheses appear to encompass a wide
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range of behaviors, it is possible that correlated hypotheses may 
approximate incorrect hypotheses as frequently as correct ones.
In view of this, the criticism directed against the early verbal 
conditioning studies for failing to deal with the problem of correlated 
hypotheses seems less conc&usLve. Granted that some Ss who were aware 
of correlated hypotheses were overlooked, it would appear highly im­
probable that the conditioning demonstrated in all the early studies 
could have been accounted for only by Ss aware of correlated hypoth­
eses. Conversely, it is not surprising that studies which have 
employed detailed postconditioning interviews, which readily accepted 
correlated hypotheses as indicative of awareness and which considered 
performance gains as proof of this should, with one exception, never 
find evidence of conditioning without awareness. This is not to say 
that postconditioning interviews have no part in verbal conditioning 
research. On the other hand, there does seem to be a limit as the 
unexpected findings of Levin (1961) disclosed. Nor does it mean that 
correlated hypotheses are not frequently indicative of an awareness 
that existed during the conditioning task. It does suggest that 
correlated hypotheses appear to lend themselves readily to misinter­
pretation and should, therefore, be evaluated cautiously.
CONCLUSIONS
Cognitive investigators of verbal operant conditioning have 
questioned the extension of principles of learning developed in the 
animal laboratory to account for the events occurring in verbal con­
ditioning situations. In particular they have challenged the concept 
of reinforcement by maintaining that the reinforcement given by E has 
no reinforcing properties but, instead, possesses only information and 
incentive value. Thus, the reinforcing stimulus can have no effect 
upon overt behavior (performance) unless mediated by a cognitive pro­
cess labeled as awareness. As might be expected, the research strat­
egy of the cognitive investigators has been primarily directed toward 
developing techniques to obtain evidence for the role of awareness in 
verbal conditioning rather than investigating the parameters of rein­
forcement .
The present study was designed to do both. To evaluate the 
role of awareness, the techniques (viz., "notes" and extensive inter­
views) developed by cognitive researches were employed. The role of 
reinforcement was investigated by controlling for frequency of experi­
ence with reinforcement through the use of "forced" Training trials.
The results obtained appear to justify the following conclusions 
concerning the relation between reinforcement, performance gains, and 
the learning of awareness in verbal conditioning.
First, performance gains (acquisition of the reinforced response 
class) can occur in verbal conditioning prior to, or in the absence of,
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awareness as a function of reinforced practice. This suggests that 
performance and awareness are both dependent variables subject to the 
same antecedent conditions (reinforcement) and that reinforcement 
exerts a differential effect upon the two.
Second, social relnforcers do not have the same strengthening 
effect upon all j>s. Individual differences in response to social re­
inforcement appear to be related more to performance than awareness.
For some j3s small amounts of reinforcement seem to be sufficient to 
produce noticeable changes in performance. In turn, these j3s are 
more apt to learn awareness. For other J5s, presumably those who are 
less responsive to social reinforcement, it appears that performance 
gains are not likely to occur in the typical verbal conditioning situa­
tion in the absence of more favorable conditions, such as a rather 
sudden shift in the pattern of response selection. Awareness does not 
necessarily appear to be a consequence of this type conditioning.
Third, although the learning of awareness may precede perfor­
mance gains in some cases, the conclusion by Spielberger and DeNike 
(1966) that acquisition of the reinforced response cannot occur in the 
absence of awareness appears to be an artifact of an insensitive 
methodology for determining the temporal relationship between perfor­
mance gains and awareness.
Fourth, hypotheses (notes) written by _Ss during the condition­
ing task can be reliably used for assigning ratings of awareness or 
unawareness.
Fifth, correlated hypotheses are the "twilight 2one" of verbal
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conditioning. Assigning ratings from notes is less reliable than for 
the other classifications and correlated hypotheses are likely to be 
suggested by detailed postconditioning interviews. In addition, they 
are often deceptive and may be easily misinterpreted, and they may not 
always be indicative of an awareness that existed during the condition­
ing task. They appear to be particularly susceptible to erroneous 
ratings of awareness.
Implications and Suggestions for Future Research
The psychotherapeutic analogue of the problem of behavior modi­
fication without awareness is whether a patient's behavior can change 
without having first achieved "insight" (Kanfer, 1965). Rather than 
"insight" being necessary for behavior to change, the question has been 
raised as to whether changed behavior in therapy increases the likeli­
hood of the patient emitting the verbal behavior labeled as "insight" 
by the therapist (Saslow, 1965). Results of the present study suggest 
that such may be the case. That is, behavior change (performance 
gains) more frequently preceded reports of awareness than was true of 
the opposite sequence of events. Further, present findings supported 
the position of Krasner and Ullmann (1963) that reported awareness is 
a verbal behavior influenced by the same variables that influence 
other kinds of verbal operants. This, in turn, implies that reports 
of awareness or "insight" can be controlled pr produced by therapists 
employing the social reinforcement model (see,e.g., Krasner and Ullmann, 
1965).
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Present findings indicate that individual differences in re­
sponse to social reinforcement play a prominent part in verbal condi­
tioning studies and, by implication, in therapies employing the 
reinforcement model. Research in this area has primarily attempted to 
establish a relationship between a given personality, intellectual or 
socially desirable variable, and the conditioning of some verbal 
operant as well as reports of awareness. Yet, most of these efforts 
have yielded contradictory and ambiguous results (see, e.g., Farber, 
1963; Matarazzo et al., 1960; Williams, 1964). One of the few clear- 
cut demonstrations of such a relationship was reported by Timmons and 
Noblin (1963), These investigators found that Freudian oral and anal 
character typesresponded differentially to positive verbal reinforce­
ment in a verbal conditioning paradigm. A later study (Noblin,
Timmons and Kael, 1966) found that oral and anal character types re­
sponded differentially to negative as well as to positive reinforce­
ment-.
Baron (1966) has recently suggested that less emphasis be 
placed on personality characteristics and more weight be given to the 
characteristics of the social reinforcement history of the individual. 
It is Baron's thesis that the individual's past reinforcement history 
produces an internal norm or frame of reference which influences his 
present receptivity to social reinforcement (cf., Helson, 1964).
Such an assumption has apparently not been tested in the verbal condi­
tioning situation using, as predictors, techniques which have been
developed for assessing j3s1 past histories of social reinforcement 
(see, e.g., Crandall, 1963; Zigler, 1961).
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The most obvious suggestion for future research growing out of 
the present experiment is that repeated assessments of awareness should 
be employed in the typical verbal conditioning paradigm to see if the 
precedence of performance gains does in fact obtain in the absence of 
"forced" reinforcement. Such a study is presently being planned.
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APPENDIX A 
Postconditioning Awareness Interview
1. What is your main idea about the rule or principle for con­
structing sentences in this experiment? What is your basis for this 
conclusion?
2. How did you go about making up your sentences?
3. How did you go about deciding which of the words to use on 
the card? (If £> did not differentiate between Training and Test cards 
he was asked to do so.)
a. Did you think you were using some of the words on the 
cards more often than others? Which words? Why?
4. Did you think you were supposed to make your Test sentences 
up in any particular way?
a. Did you come to think that there was anything you were 
supposed to say, or not say, on each Test sentence in 
order to be correct?
b. Did you think there was, or wasn't, any kind of correct 
way for making up the Test sentences?
c. Did you think there was anything the experimenter 
wanted you to say or not say on the Test sentences?
(If, in answering Questions 1-4, S mentioned the fact that E 
had said "Good," "Fine," or "Mmm-hmm," Questions 5-7 were not asked.)
5. During the experiment did you notice the experimenter doing 
anything in particular?
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6. Did you notice that he said anything?
7. Actually he did occasionally say something. Thinking back
now, do you remember him saying anything while you were going through
the cards?
(If j> still did not verbalize "Good," etc. this was pointed out 
to him and the interview continued.)
8. Did you try to figure out what made the experimenter say
"Good?"
a. Did you come to think that there was any purpose or 
significance to the experimenter saying "Good," etc.
b. Do you think it was random or did it follow anything 
in particular that you did?
9. Do you think that his saying "Good," etc. on the Training
trials had anything to do with the words you chose to begin your Test
sentences?
a. Did you think that you were supposed to change the 
way in which you made up your Test sentences as the 
experiment went along?
b. Do you think you actually changed the way in which you 
made up your Test sentences as the experiment went 
along?
c. How hard would you say you tried to improve your per­
formance on the Test sentences?
d. How did you go about trying to improve your Test sen­
tences?
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e. Did you usually construct your Test sentences according 
to the ideas you wrote down during the experiment?
f. How helpful did you find the Training trials?
10. What was your reaction or attitude toward the experimenter 
saying "Good," etc.?
a. How hard would you say you tried to figure out what was 
making him say "Good?" Very hard? Fairly hard? Not 
hard at all?
b. Would you say you wanted the experimenter to say "Good" 
very much, some, or didn't care one way or the other?
11. I would like for you to state again your main idea about
the rule or principle for constructing sentences in this experiment.
(If j3 added anything new, the following two questions were asked.)
a. Is that something you were actually aware of while 
going through the cards or is it something you thought 
of since the interview began?
b. Did you write that in your notes?
12. At any time while going through the cards did you have the
idea that the experimenter was saying "Good" after sentences beginning 
with certain pronouns? If yes;
a. Which pronouns?
b. Did you write that in your notes? (If no, j3 was asked 
"Why not?")
c. Did the fact that you realized this have any effect on 
the way in which you made up your Test sentences?
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13. Did you ever have the idea that the experimenter was saying 
"Good” after sentences beginning with I and We? He- and They?
a. Why did he do that?
14. Have you ever participated in an experiment like this
before?
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